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This article presents an adaptation of the labour supply model applied to the independent 
medical in which doctor’s choice of the length of consultations is examined. A theoretical 
analysis is performed in an attempt to define the sets of constraints to which self-employed 
doctors are subject, and they show a marked difference in time-allocation behaviour 
according to whether medical care is provided under a fixed-fee scheme or under an 
unregulated-fees scheme, respectively “sector 1” and “sector 2” in France. The objective 
of this econometric study was to analyse time-allocation choices made by doctors in both 
sectors in France and to validate the theoretical prediction that doctors under unregulated-
fees can make choices about the length of patient consultations independently of their 
personal leisure choices. According to our empirical results, doctors with unregulated-fees 
indeed show different behaviours regarding leisure-consumption choices and consultation 
length. The endogeneity of leisure choice to consultation length –verified in fixed-fee 
scheme- is no longer apparent under unregulated-fee. Our findings can be seen as a 
necessary, but insufficient, condition for legitimate unregulated fees in general practice. 
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Introduction 
Planning the supply of ambulatory healthcare is a key component of the healthcare 
organisation in a country, both from the perspective of the well-being of the population and 
the perspective of public finances or health insurance. Independent ambulatory healthcare, 
which has been adopted by many countries for greater freedom of choice and higher quality 
of treatment, nevertheless comes at a cost. Public authorities can control fewer aspects of 
the system. In fact, three crucial parameters currently escape the control of the regulator: 
the location of the activity, the length of work, and the length of patient consultations, all of 
which have been associated with the quality of healthcare. The location and the geographic 
dimensions do not fall within the scope of this paper (see, for example, Scott, 20011). 
Different types of incentives can be implemented to better control physicians when they 
establish their practices. This paper focuses on the two other aspects of control mentioned 
above: duration of work and duration of patient consultation, which are perhaps the most 
difficult to control in an independent medical sector. 
Few studies examining independent practitioners have simultaneously analysed total work 
time and the length of patient consultations. The few available references concerning 
determinants of the length of consultation highlight medical factors: patients’ 
characteristics, the prevalence of severe illness, and sometimes physicians’ characteristics 
such as gender, age, and modalities of economic organisation (e.g. group practice versus 
solo).2 Few studies have attempted to link the “length of consultation” to the “total work 
time”, such as to test the relationship by which total work time, which is an indicator of the 
availability of the doctor, can influence the time devoted to individual patients. Labour 
economists have taken an occasional interest in the overall labour supply of doctors.3 
                                                           
1 In other countries, such as Canada, financial incentives have already been introduced specifically 
aimed at encouraging doctors to set up practices in the regions of Quebec where there is a lack of 
doctors (Bolduc et al, 1996). 
2 Martin et al. (1997) and Carr-Hill et al. (1998), for example, find that female doctors dealing with 
patients of the same sex hold the longest consultations. Deveugele et al. (2002) claim that one-third of 
the variability in lengths of consultation is due to characteristics of the doctors and two-thirds is due 
to characteristics of the patients.  These authors used data comparing several series of consultations in 
different Western countries. Scott and Shiell (1997) report similar results for Australia.  
3 The relevant references in the field are: Sloan (1975), Noether (1986), Rizzo and 
Blumenthal (1994). The last provide an estimation of the elasticity of 0.23 for the labour supply to 
wages, with an adjusted price-elasticity of 0.44. In a study of the response of the medical labour 
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However, even in these studies, the length of consultation is often left aside, in our opinion, 
for two reasons:  
-the scarcity of data allowing researchers to test for interaction among the length of 
consultation, patients’ characteristics, and the physicians’ socio-economic characteristics, 
e.g., income, prices, and other data necessary for defining the work/leisure trade-off; and  
-a “cultural bias” in labour economics, which gives that investigators rarely consider labour 
supply outside a wage-based contract and so they rarely take into account the specificities 
of independent activities (e.g., for lawyers, notaries, physicians) for which payment per 
hour cannot be computed from tariffs only (because, in fee-for-services, the time devoted to 
services may vary).  
The dual dimension of these choices is illustrated in Figure 1. The time endowment Z0 is 
divided into two traditional components: leisure and working time. However, contrary to 
standard labour economics, the latter is not “homogeneous,” and it depends on the choice of 
consultation length. A given working-time can therefore be calculated from multiple 
combinations of consultations of different length. The physician has a larger choice set with 
which to construct her consumption-leisure trade-off, but at the same time she also faces a 
larger set of constraints. 
Figure 1. Work/leisure tradeoff and free distribution of consultations 
 
Z, leisure h, working time 
Z0, time endowment 
b, consultation length 
 
In this paper, we present a standard work/leisure trade-off model adapted to independent 
medical activity, which contrasts with contractual labour in the following characteristics: no 
flat-rate payment (tariff per consultation), greater freedom in determining schedules (length 
of consultation), but a stricter and more direct set of medical and professional constraints 
concerning work activity and income (the patients are “customers”). Section 1 attempts to 
define the sets of constraints (economic and medical) to which independent doctors are 
                                                                                                                                                      
supply to the tax system, Showalter and Thurston (1997) find that self-employed doctors are more 
sensitive to the marginal rates of taxation, with an elasticity of 0.33, than are wage-earning doctors. A 
study of Norwegian micro-data by Sæther (2003) confirms that the response of wage-earning hospital 
doctors is low.  
- 4 - 
subject when choosing their activity. This allows us to more accurately determine the 
factors influencing the length of consultation and the rules of work/leisure trade-off for this 
profession. Section 2 presents the data obtained from a sample of 1,901 general 
practitioners (GPs) working independently in 2006 in five regions of France. The empirical 
study discusses the theory, using the specificities of the French independent medical sector 
with two payment schemes sectors coexisting (see Appendix B for a brief description). The 
objective of the econometric study was to test whether doctors’ choices are affected by the 
payment characteristics of the sector in which they operate (unregulated versus fixed fees). 
Section 3 presents the results of econometric modelling, which show highly contrasting 
behaviours between doctors in “sector 1,” limited by a fixed-fee system --i.e. fixed by an 
agreement between national health insurance and physicians’ trade unions that allows 
patients to be reimbursed by public health insurance-- and doctors in “sector 2,” where 
there is greater freedom for doctors to set the fees. 
  
1. Supply of services by GPs  
In this section we present a behavioural model for the supply of services by GPs according 
to the characteristics of their environment. The choice of the doctor is illustrated in the 
framework of the neo-classical theory of the labour supply, taking into account the 
economic and medical constraints that independent doctors face when choosing their time-
activity.  
1.1. Objectives, constraints, and choice of activity in the case of an ambulatory 
general practitioner 
In the context of labour supply theory, the doctor’s aim is to obtain an income from her 
work that enables her to finance all or part of her consumption (her standard of living). 
Formally, the physician’s choice can be expressed as follows: 
( )
( )
0
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                                                              (1) 
The objective function traditionally adopted is a utility function U(C,Z) integrating the 
consumption of a generic good, C, and leisure, Z (Thornton and Eakin (1998)). Leisure is 
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defined as the amount of time available once the medical activity is completed. The doctor 
has a fixed time endowment, Z0, which she is free to distribute between leisure, Z, and the 
total time of her medical activity. Each consultation has a length denoted by b. The doctor 
undertakes a number of consultations, n. The price of the consumer good is fixed per unit, 
and the price of each consultation is expressed by w. In programme 1, physicians are 
confronted with a number of constraints: 
• a budgetary constraint regarding the purchase of consumer goods; 
• a time constraint distributing the time available between work and leisure; 
• a constraint on the minimum quality of healthcare provided with a minimum 
threshold for the length of consultation (noted as b ). This constraint may be based 
on respect for professional standards or institutional rules, patient demands, or 
even social behavioural rules; 
• a market constraint, since the supply of independent healthcare services must 
correspond to patients’ demand. 
We consider that each doctor acts in a context of monopolistic competition. She is therefore 
facing a demand with finite price elasticity. The demand for GP services d(w,b) is a 
function of the price of those services (price per consultation) and the length of the 
consultation (b). McGuire (2000) proposes a “net benefit function” for the patient that 
depends on the fee, the level of medical activity, and the level of quality provided by the 
physician. This net benefit function plays a role similar to our demand function. The patient 
is sensitive to the price of medical activities and to the level of quality supplied by the 
physician. In our model, we consider “quality” and “length of consultation” equivalent, an 
assumption already suggested by McGuire (2000) and confirmed by empirical studies 
(Freeman at al. (2002) for a review of Britain). In short, this means that patients perceive 
the length of consultation as a measure of quality.  
For medical labour supply, the message of this model is that the “cost of quality” is defined 
by the value of the time spent in each consultation in terms of leisure losses. Doctors not 
only have to decide their total working-time, but also to fine-tune a partition of total 
working-time between quantity and quality. The final choice regarding Z (total time) and b 
(length of consultation) will be a complex trade-off defined at both the supply side 
(intrinsic preference for leisure) and the patient side (demand for quality).  
The characteristics of the healthcare system also influence the possible choices of 
ambulatory medical activity. The model enables us to describe two simple situations. In the 
first case, the price of a consultation is centrally established and is the result, for example, 
of negotiations between the unions and the Social Security or an arbitrary price fixed by the 
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government. When the price of a consultation is set, the doctor can decide only the length 
of the consultation and the number of consultations undertaken. In the case of “deregulated 
fees,” the doctor can adjust her prices above the minimum level established by the 
regulations. These two situations are studied successively in order to demonstrate the 
interaction between institutional and economic constraints and the preferences of the self-
employed GP in choosing her activity.  
1.2. Choice of activity and fixed price per consultation 
For doctors subject to a fixed-price w , the choice is based on the length of consultation b 
and the number of consultations n. In this context, the first-order Kuhn and Tucker 
conditions of programme (1) can be written as follows, maximising U in n and b: 
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with: ( ) ( ), / ,  , /Z CU U C Z Z U U C Z C= ! ! = ! ! . 
Several situations must be considered according to whether or not the constraints4 of 
minimum quality and market equilibrium are bounded. The first situation occurs when 
physicians use consultation length to maximise patient satisfaction and thereby attract 
demand and balance the local market of medical consultations. In this case, the market 
constraint is bounded and the quality constraint is relaxed; in this way, the length of 
consultation offered is greater than the minimum fixed duration. This results in the system: 
()()()22///1,ZCUUwbndwb!!"=+#$%&'(=%)
                                     (3) 
which determines both the length and the number of consultations realised by the doctor. 
Here, ε2 represents the length-elasticity of demand. The budgetary constraint and the time 
                                                           
4 The list of inequality constraints is not exhaustive. A certain number of constraints were ignored as 
being non-pertinent for the analysis undertaken in this paper. For example, this is true for the 
constraint
0
Z Z! , which is widely used in studies concerning participation on the labour market. In 
this paper, all doctors questioned earned at least a part of their professional income from their 
independent activities, and they did not choose total inactivity as being an optimum solution. The 
existence of large fixed costs linked to the independent activity of the doctor (length of schooling, 
fixed installation costs) is a priori sufficient to guarantee the existence of an internal solution to the 
labour supply problem. 
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constraint provide the recursive definition of the level of consumption and the level of 
leisure achieved. This system of equations demonstrates that the choice of the consultation 
length is based both on physicians’ preferences in terms of consumption and leisure and on 
the characteristics of the demand. Simple calculus shows that the marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption for leisure ( / )
Z C
U U  is equal to the “fee” 
w
, corrected by a 
factor 
()()221//1b!!+"#$%
, where 
2
!  simplifies the mathematical writing of the elasticity 
of the demand to b. 
This former correction can be explained by the specificities of the fee-for-service activity. 
Indeed, in the context of the medical activity, the doctor controls the length of consultation. 
Therefore, the pertinent remuneration is not the payment of the service, w , but rather the 
price per consultation time unit /w b . The margins of adjustment are greater than for an 
“ordinary” employee due to the ability to fine-tune total work time in accordance with the 
length (given by b) and number of consultations accepted (given by elasticity 
2
! ).  
1.3. Choice of activity and “deregulated fees” 
The ability to adjust prices offers the doctor an additional opportunity to modify the 
demand on her services (in addition to the variable b). This situation occurs when the 
doctor is not subject to a fixed-price agreement, such as with Social Security in France. In 
this case, the first-order Kuhn and Tucker conditions of programme (1) can be expressed as 
follows, maximising U in n, b and w: 
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When doctors can choose the consultation price, the market is automatically balanced 
(demand = supply for all λ2 ≠ 0)5. When the duration constraint is not bounded (b> b ), the 
choice of the quantity, length, and price of the consultations obeys: 
                                                           
5 The particular case of zero leisure ( )0Z =  is an exception. This specific case is not considered 
here. In the empirical section, the case is excluded, since the total work-time necessarily requires 
provision for rest time.  
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where ε1 represents the price-elasticity of demand.  
This can also be expressed by: 
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The physician thus chooses the length and the price of consultation according to the 
characteristics of the patients in order to balance “price effects” and “quality effect” in her 
demand ( )1 21 0! !+ + = . The first two equations in (7) could be written as a mark-up over 
price 
1()/1/wew!"="
 and a mark-up over consultation cost 
2()/1/wee!"=
with 
(/)ZCebUU=
. In this situation of “deregulated fees,” the doctor has a new variable for 
adjusting her market (by managing her list of active patients) and acts according to the best 
interests of her consumption/leisure trade-off. In other words, the length of consultation is 
not the only variable for adjusting total demand for the doctor: w is added to b. In this 
second case, the first-order conditions give 01
21
=++ !! , which gives the conditions of 
the trade-off between quality and price – with 1! denoting the elasticity of demand to the 
price. In other words, the ability of the GP to regulate demand by price--instead of only by 
length of consultation--allows her to escape the situation in which she would have to 
decrease quality in order to gain leisure. In this way, creating a non-fixed-fees sector for 
independent GPs is expected to increase social well-being.  
However, note that a “special case” occurs when the physician, while free to choose the 
price, decides to modulate only the length of consultation and to adopt the regulation price 
level 
w
 for her consultations. In this situation, the doctor deliberately chooses to position 
herself at 
w
 as a result of her preferences and economic constraints, without being linked 
to any institutional constraint. This “corner solution” to the lowest fee may correspond to a 
situation in which the elasticity of demand to price is so high (poor patients, for example) 
that it is not possible to maintain a substantive clientele (n) by any adjustment of the 
quality/price ratio (b/p). Carrère (1991) has already shown that doctors can choose this 
corner solution when working with poor clients. 
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2. The data 
The sample of doctors for our analysis is taken from a panel survey that has been conducted 
since March 2007 and that examines the medical practices of 1,901 general practitioners in 
five French regions: Basse–Normandie, Bourgogne, Bretagne, Pays de la Loire, and 
Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur. The panel was compiled from a joint initiative of the Ministry 
of Health, the National Federation of the Regional Centres for Disease Control (ORS), and 
the five Regional Unions of Self-employed Doctors (URML) in the regions concerned. In 
each region, the doctors selected for this study are representative of the overall population 
of GPs (see Aulagnier et al. 2007). The sample was obtained by random stratified sampling 
with the strata defined by gender, age (under 45, 45-54, 54 and older in 2006) and location 
(urban, suburban, rural). Doctors planning to stop practising or to move out of the region, 
as well as those who practiced exclusively complementary or alternative medicines such as 
homeopathy and acupuncture were excluded. The first survey wave took place in March 
and April 2007. It collected data from GPs concerning levels of activity, such as workload, 
list size, and number and type of consultations. This wave also includes data from the 
Individual Receipt for Activity and Prescribing (IRAP), an administrative document given 
to GPs by the Social Security, which records all reimbursed spending of patients. It enables 
the precise computation of activity for each practitioner of the panel. The three variables of 
interest used in the present analysis were obtained as follows.  
The variable “leisure time” (in hours per week) is defined as the time remaining after 
deduction of the time each doctor reported to have worked: Z=Z0-(n.b). More precisely, 
leisure time is calculated as seven times 24 hours (Z0) minus the declared number of hours 
worked for a typical week, i.e. a week without public holidays or other holidays. In this 
calculation, we nevertheless added the weekly leisure time corresponding to the declared 
number of weeks of holidays. 
The variable “length of consultation” (b, in minutes) was calculated by dividing the time 
devoted to patients (total time worked as an independent, minus the time devoted to 
administrative tasks, medical training, and speaking with medical representatives) by the 
number of consultations. The calculation takes into account a constant transport time for all 
house calls of 10-20 minutes, with the precise value depending on whether the GP was 
located in an urban or rural area. We obtained an average rhythm of practice, which is not 
observed directly on any specific day, but rather reflects average rhythm of activity over an 
entire year.  
The variable “price of consultation”, w, is declared by each GP in sector 2 as the “usual 
fees demanded”. Generally, GPs in sector 2 display their fees in the waiting room. Thus, we 
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can hypothesize that GPs have declared this amount, although GPs can modulate their fees 
case by case, “with tact and moderation” as the Medical Council (“Ordre des médecins”) 
describes. Our GP sample includes 120 doctors in sector 2 (1,556 in sector 1). In sector 1, 
the fee for consultation was fixed at 21 euros in 2007 (w ).  
The calculation of the three variables above is based on survey data. These data have one 
disadvantage in that they are partially self-reported by physicians. On the other hand, the 
data provide information not available elsewhere, for example, data concerning unregulated 
fees, income, or total work time, which includes “non-medical tasks” such as 
administrative work, waiting and reception times of patients, reading and research time, and 
self-training.  
Other information that could lead to an occasional increase in the price or length of 
consultations was not available in the database. For example, information was unavailable 
on the type of consultation (week-end, public holiday, night, emergency, on-call), the 
content of the consultation (type of pathology, technical or surgical intervention undertaken 
during the consultation), and the reason for the consultation (first consultation at the request 
of the patient, or follow-up consultation to monitor a previously identified pathology). 
Nevertheless, we can control our econometric regressions, which are generated using 
averaged variables for each GP, by globally characterising of their patient-list: % of 
patients between two given ages and % under the poverty level (see Tables 2-7).6  
The average age of respondent physicians is 52 for men and 47 for women. Just over half 
(55.5%) of the physicians work in group practices, while 41.5% own their own practice.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: consultation length, leisure time  
Variable  
[expressed as mean (stand. error)] 
Billing sector 1 : “fixed 
fees” 
(n = 1556) 
Billing sector 2 : 
“unregulated fees” 
 (n = 120) 
Consultation length (minutes) 24.9 (10.7) 34.8 (18.2) 
Leisure time per week (hours) 69.0 (13.0) 70.1 (11.5) 
Average consultation fee (euros) 21 (-) 30.2 (9.2) 
Note: Table 1 includes the 1,676 GPs for whom econometric analysis was possible (information for all variables 
was complete). Half of the 225 missing GPs could not be included in the final sample for technical reasons, 
including the impossibility of matching them with the database-system of the Social Security, known in French as 
the Système National d’Information Inter-Régime de l’Assurance Maladie (SNIIRAM).  
GP respondents reported an average weekly working-time, including time on call, of 56.6 
hours. Male doctors work considerably more than female doctors throughout their 
                                                           
6 Consultations undertaken outside the scope of reimbursed healthcare are not considered, 
e.g., telephone or free consultations. 
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professional life: 58.6 hours per week compared to 50.9 for women. However, the weekly 
working time does not differ significantly between the two GP groups that we defined for 
this study: 56.7 hours for sector 1, compared to 56.0 hours for sector 2. The average 
consultation length for respondent doctors, including the periods of inactivity between 
patients, is 25.6 minutes, with significant differences (p < 0.0001) based on gender (29.0 
minutes for women compared to 24.5 minutes for men) and sector (24.9 minutes for sector 
1 compared to 34.8 minutes for sector 2). The average price of consultation in sector 2 is 
30.2 euros. 
3. Results 
3.1 Lessons from the theoretical model for the estimation strategy 
The theoretical model has shown two important points that allow us to better define the 
empirical study: 
-First, the set of constraints, as well as the results of the optimisation program, are clearly 
different between sector 1 and sector 2. It would be erroneous to pool the data and test a 
unique econometric model for the whole sample. There are in fact two features of choice 
for each sector of activity (fix fees versus unregulated fees). 
-Second, the econometric model has to be estimated in a structural form because both the 
length of consultation and the total workload are endogenous to one another.7 The first-
order conditions of the theoretical analysis demonstrate a concomitant determination of 
hours worked (or leisure time) and length of GP consultation, both as a function of the 
environment of the GP (i.e. the characteristics of the patients, and the set of economic 
constraints linked to the sector of activity), and as a function of the personal characteristics 
of the GP (psychological parameters concerning her taste for leisure or family constraints, 
any of which may affect her availability to work). 
Subsequently, the econometric model is estimated in a structural form using a linear system 
of simultaneous equations. The endogeneity of the two variables of interest (length of 
consultation and leisure time) is tested separately for each sector of activity. All the 
continuous variables are converted into logarithms, which enables us to interpret the 
estimated coefficients as elasticities while simultaneously reducing the heteroskedasticity 
of the model. 
                                                           
7 Thornton and Eakin (1998) defend a similar method for both price and labour supply. Note that we 
also test the endogeneity of fees, and find no endogeneity once the endogeneity of consultation length 
has been taken into account. 
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The objectives of the econometric study are two-fold. The first objective is to verify that 
doctors’ choices are indeed affected by the “market characteristics” of the sector of activity 
in which they operate, and, in particular, to ascertain that GPs benefiting from deregulated 
fees (sector 2) adopt a different behaviour from other GPs (sector 1). The second objective 
is to identify the direction of certain effects that remained ambiguous in the theoretical 
model, in particular the “price-sensitivity” of leisure time and length of consultations, both 
of which can be positive or negative depending on whether income effects or substitution 
effects dominate—as is the case in the microeconomics of any labour supply. This is even 
more complex in the case of independent supply of medical services because, in addition to 
their total labour supply, doctors may also adjust the consultation itself by increasing the 
number of shorter consultations. In sector 2, an additional level of ambiguity is observed 
since GPs set both the price and length of the consultations. Note that, since 1990, GPs 
cannot enter sector 2 except in the exceptional case when she has an especially high level of 
education. Thus, we disregard problems of participation bias in sectors of practice.  
The results are presented in Tables 2-3 for sector 1 and in Tables 4-5 for sector 2. In each 
table, the model adopted according to endogeneity and heteroskedasticity tests (White, 
1980, Lee et al., 1980, Davidson et MacKinnon, 1993, Pesaran et Taylor, 1999) is 
underlined in bold. All analyses were carried out using Stata Version 9.2. In our discussion 
of the results, we comment only on the effects that affect the variables of the theoretical 
model (consultation length and leisure time) in relation to the sector (1 versus 2) and to the 
prices set in sector 2. The other econometric effects conform to economic intuition.  
3.2. Price-elasticity of the length of consultation: the higher the fees for 
consultation, the longer the consultations. 
In Table 4, the coefficient of 0.82 obtained for sector 2 can be perfectly interpreted in terms 
of classic price-elasticity. For a 10% increase in the price applied, the average length of 
consultation increases by 8.2%, i.e. an average of three minutes longer. It is clear that this 
result, obtained in sector 2, documents a behaviour in which doctors are free to set their 
own price and the patients are free to accept the consultation, its length, and its fees, always 
assuming that an alternative exists in the geographical zone of the patient, which, given the 
density of medical facilities in France, is certainly realistic. In other words, in the present 
case, the econometric analysis measures an “agreement” between the GP and the patient 
that serves to balance the length of the consultation and the price paid. The consultation is 
longer but it is also more expensive.  
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In sector 1, it was not possible to observe price elasticity in this first transversal study; all 
doctors charged the same regulated fee of 21 euros in 2007. In future research, repeated 
collection of data could help to evaluate reactions to official changes in fees. 
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3.2. Deregulated fees and doctor’s behaviour regarding leisure choice: increased 
flexibility of behaviour in sector 2 
First, the behaviours of doctors, as estimated by separate structural models for sector 1 and 
sector 2, reveal substantially different leisure choices. The econometric result illustrates the 
endogeneity of leisure time in relation to the length of consultation for GPs in sector 1 
(Table 3). This is not the case in sector 2 (Table 5). The same econometric approach also 
shows that, in both cases, the inverse correlation of length of consultation to leisure is not 
significant (p > 0.5 in both cases, Tables 2 and 4). In sector 1, GPs seem to establish 
consultation length first according to external constraints, independently of their leisure 
time choice, and more as a function of the patients’ characteristics. This consultation length 
subsequently determines the leisure time in sector 1 in a negative manner (correlation 
coefficient = –0.052, p < 0.001). In other words, the more time a doctor can devote to 
patients, the less time the doctor has for leisure time, which is a logical relationship. In 
contrast, Table 5 indicates a situation in sector 2 in which GPs seem to retain a certain 
degree of personal freedom in their leisure choices. This latter variable of interest shows no 
correlation with consultation length (β=0.039, p < 0.603). 
This result appears highly intuitive in light of the theoretical results obtained in section 1. 
GPs in sector 2 can compensate for the deleterious effects of a relatively high average 
consultation length on their leisure time by charging higher prices. Fee is a variable of 
adjustment that substitutes for leisure time in sector 1. For an aged or seriously ill clientele, 
who have longer time consultations than other patient populations, GPs in sector 2 can, for 
example, maintain a satisfactory income by increasing the price per consultation. In sector 
1, this strategy is not possible and the GP suffers more from the constraints imposed by the 
characteristics of her patients. If she wishes to maintain a high income, her leisure time is 
the only variable of adjustment. The higher the average consultation length, the less leisure 
time is available. 
Finally, a third equation is tested for sector 2. This equation examines the possible 
endogeneity of fee to the two other dependant variables, leisure time and consultation 
length. The exogeneity test is rejected for the length of consultation (p < 0.001). Table 6 
shows the resulting convenient model produced with the 3SLS methodology. 
 
Conclusion 
Conclusions from this study address several different dimensions of the labour supply 
problem of GPs working independently in France. If we concentrate solely on the 
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relationship between price and length of consultation, and we consider the situation in the 
most favourable terms as possible, then the study confirms a positive correlation between 
consultation length and price. It appears that physicians translate a price increase into an 
improved quality of treatment, as estimated from the average consultation length. This 
result confirms the theoretical analysis developed in section 1. In the context of a social 
justification for deregulated fees, this result tends to legitimise sector 2 since it enables 
doctors to separate the need for treatment linked to their patients from their own 
considerations and economic constraints. When doctors can equate each elementary 
consultation to an ad hoc price, the price per minute of the medical intervention can be held 
constant regardless of the length of the consultation. The economic neutrality of “patients in 
good health – seriously ill patients” is perfectly achieved. 
Conversely, if we take a more severe standpoint, we are struck by the result considered a 
contrario. In the event of regulation of the price of consultations (in sector 1), doctors tend 
to increase the number of short consultations in order to compensate for the decrease in 
income. This effect is very often voiced in the public debate on the possibility of increasing 
the price of medical consultation.  
In sum, these results strengthen the idea that consultation length devoted to patients cannot 
be easily disconnected from doctors’ preferences (sector 1 composes 90% of GPs). The 
unregulated fees strategy is one possibility. However, it must be balanced with its cost, 
namely an increase in fees and the likely consequence of a redistribution of welfare from 
patient to doctors. In this way, our results could be seen as a necessary, but clearly not 
sufficient, condition to legitimate unregulated fees in general practices. 
 
 
- 16 - 
Appendix A: Tables 
Table 2. Length of consultation (log) – Sector 1 
 
 OLS OLS and robust 2SLS 
Leisure time (log) -0.218 -0.218 -0.268 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.544) 
Male -0.158 -0.158 -0.161 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** 
% of home visits -0.537 -0.537 -0.554 
 (0.000)** (0.021)* (0.007)** 
Alternative medicine (occasionally) 0.074 0.074 0.073 
 (0.032)* (0.020)* (0.041)* 
Desire to reduce working time -0.130 -0.130 -0.135 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.009)** 
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.041)* (0.029)* (0.040)* 
Married -0.159 -0.159 -0.158 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Group practice -0.109 -0.109 -0.107 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** 
-0.734 -0.734 -0.735 % of patients with free healthcare because of 
low income (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
% of patients between 60-69 y (log) -1.038 -1.038 -1.069 
 (0.076)+ (0.086)+ (0.105) 
% of patients between 0-16 y (log) -1.846 -1.846 -1.869 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Spouse working  0.056 0.056 0.057 
 (0.038)* (0.043)* (0.040)* 
Constant 5.132 5.132 5.357 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.007)** 
Number of observations 1520 1520 1519 
R² # 0.126 0.126 0.117 
R² adjusted # 0.119 0.119 0.111 
AIC 1862.066 1862.066 1885.399 
BIC 1931.310 1931.310 1949.364 
White’s heteroskedasticity test  
(P-value) 0.162 - - 
Sargan’s over-identification test  
(P-value) - - 0.689 
White/Koenker heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.169 
Pagan/Hall heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.178 
Anderson under-identification test 
(P-value)   0.000 
P-values in brackets; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
# Pesaran-Smith R² generalised for the 2SLS 
 
Nakamura/Nakamura’s test gives “Leisure time” as endogenous (p = 0.000); therefore the 2SLS 
model shows a better fit (in bold). 
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Table 3. Leisure time (log) – Sector 1 
 
 OLS OLS and robust 2SLS 
Length of consultation (log) -0.052 -0.052 -0.054 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.470) 
Desire to reduce working time -0.107 -0.107 -0.108 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Group practice 0.042 0.042 0.043 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.003)** 
Urban location -0.053 -0.053 -0.051 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Male -0.087 -0.087 -0.087 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Offers free consultation (sometimes) -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.030)* (0.026)* (0.033)* 
% of home visits -0.375 -0.375 -0.388 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
% of patients between 0-16 y (log) -0.257 -0.257 -0.280 
 (0.032)* (0.051)+ (0.091)+ 
Additional diploma since doctorate -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 
 (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.015)* 
Constant 4.626 4.626 4.638 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Number of observations 1537 1537 1519 
R² # 0.147 0.147 0.130 
R² adjusted # 0.142 0.142 0.126 
AIC -322.409 -322.409 -312.139 
BIC -269.033 -269.033 -263.650 
White’s heteroskedasticity test  
(P-value) 0.005 - - 
Sargan’s over-identification test  
(P-value) - - 0.180 
White/Koenker heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.029 
Pagan/Hall heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.032 
Anderson under-identification test 
(P-value)   0.000 
P-values in brackets; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
# Pesaran-Smith R² generalised for the 2SLS 
 
Nakamura/Nakamura’s test gives “Length of consultation” as exogenous (p = 0.781). An OLS 
regression (in bold) shows a better fit. 
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Table 4. Length of consultation (log) – Sector 2 
 
 OLS OLS robust 2SLS 3SLS 
Leisure time (log) -0.175 -0.175 -1.219 -0.111 
 (0.421) (0.356) (0.065)+ (0.600) 
Price of consultation (log) 0.820 0.820 0.849 0.706 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.068)+ 
% of home visits -0.856 -0.856 -1.205 -1.102 
 (0.052)+ (0.075)+ (0.023)* (0.027)* 
Group practice -0.167 -0.167 -0.180 -0.210 
 (0.050)* (0.050)+ (0.059)+ (0.012)* 
Internet connection  0.583 0.583 0.755 0.409 
 (0.016)* (0.023)* (0.009)** (0.042)* 
% of patients between 0-16 y (log) -1.239 -1.239 -1.441 -1.169 
 (0.036)* (0.021)* (0.031)* (0.035)* 
Offers free consultation (sometimes) -0.235 -0.235 -0.297 -0.193 
 (0.010)* (0.011)* (0.007)** (0.013)* 
Male -0.147 -0.147 -0.262 -0.119 
 (0.177) (0.079)+ (0.059)+ (0.252) 
Alternative medicine (occasionally)  0.169 0.169 0.156 0.172 
 (0.045)* (0.068)+ (0.099)+ (0.043)* 
Urban location 0.223 0.223 0.261 0.211 
 (0.132) (0.135) (0.136) (0.176) 
0.125 0.125 0.040 0.189 Participates in continuing medical 
education (0.274) (0.321) (0.772) (0.065)+ 
Constant 1.258 1.258 5.718 1.463 
 (0.256) (0.233) (0.046)* (0.323) 
Number of observations 119 119 117 116 
R² # 0.553 0.553 0.459 0.550 
R² adjusted # 0.507 0.507 0.402 0.508 
AIC 122.296 122.296 144.845 121.018 
BIC 155.646 155.646 177.991 151.589 
White’s heteroskedasticity test  
(P-value) 0.061 - - - 
Sargan’s over-identification test  
(P-value) - - 0.955 - 
White/Koenker heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.103 - 
Pagan/Hall heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.150 - 
Anderson under-identification test 
(P-value) - - 0.014 - 
P-values in brackets; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
# Pesaran-Smith R² generalised for the 2SLS 
 
Nakamura/Nakamura’s test gives “Leisure time” as exogenous (p = 0.114). 
 
Nakamura/Nakamura’s test gives “Price of consultation” as endogenous (p=0.000), and the reverse 
correlation also valid (Table 6). Therefore the 3SLS model shows a better fit (in bold). 
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Table 5. Leisure Time (log) – Sector 2  
 
 OLS OLS & robust 2SLS 
Length of consultation (log) 0.007 0.007 0.039 
 (0.847) (0.839) (0.603) 
Price of consultation (log) 0.054 0.054 0.018 
 (0.490) (0.439) (0.872) 
Desire to reduce working time -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 
 (0.019)* (0.016)* (0.019)* 
Spouse working 0.098 0.098 0.101 
 (0.005)** (0.014)* (0.005)** 
Married -0.193 -0.193 -0.197 
 (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
-1.369 -1.369 -1.347 % of patients exempted from payment for 
medical reasons (0.005)** (0.014)* (0.006)** 
1.952 1.952 1.977 % of patients with free healthcare because 
of low income (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.005)** 
Offers free consultation (sometimes) -0.075 -0.075 -0.065 
 (0.053)+ (0.028)* (0.131) 
% of patients between 60-69 y (log) 1.647 1.647 1.611 
 (0.045)* (0.060)+ (0.051)+ 
Has an internet connection 0.075 0.075 0.061 
 (0.444) (0.016)* (0.553) 
Constant 4.175 4.175 4.198 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Number of observations 117 117 117 
R² # 0.239 0.239 0.210 
R² adjusted # 0.167 0.167 0.149 
AIC -81.943 -81.943 -60.378 
BIC -51.559 -51.559 -32.095 
White’s heteroskedasticity test  
(P-value) 0.649 - - 
Sargan’s over-identification test  
(P-value) - - 0.611 
White/Koenker heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.664 
Pagan/Hall heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.647 
Anderson under-identification test 
(P-value) - - 0.000 
P-values in brackets; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
# Pesaran-Smith R² generalised for the 2SLS 
 
Nakamura/Nakamura’s test gives “Length of consultation” as endogenous (p = 0.028); therefore the 
2SLS model shows a better fit (in bold). 
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Table 6. Price of consultation (log) – Sector 2  
 
 OLS OLS & robust 3SLS 
Length of consultation (log) 0.205 0.205 0.800 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Participates to professional organisations (/unions) -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 
 (0.339) (0.335) (0.601) 
Alternative medicine (occasionally) 0.041 0.041 -0.194 
 (0.310) (0.278) (0.027)* 
Male -0.057 -0.057 0.062 
 (0.288) (0.227) (0.527) 
Urban location -0.177 -0.177 -0.273 
 (0.010)* (0.004)** (0.028)* 
% of patients between 0-16 y (log) 0.660 0.660 1.480 
 (0.057)+ (0.087)+ (0.022)* 
% of patients between 60-69 y (log) 4.192 4.192 1.101 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.524) 
% of patients between 70 ans et plus (log) -1.272 -1.272 0.248 
 (0.002)** (0.004)** (0.756) 
Leisure time (log) 0.085 0.085 0.011 
 (0.408) (0.397) (0.955) 
Constant 2.035 2.035 0.315 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.736) 
Number of observations 117 117 117 
R² # 0.519 0.519 0.371 
R² adjusted # 0.479 0.479 0.328 
AIC -48.829 -48.829 -13.916 
BIC -21.207 -21.207 11.539 
White’s heteroskedasticity test  
(P-value) 0.009 - - 
Sargan’s over-identification test  
(P-value) - - 0.036 
White/Koenker heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.065 
Pagan/Hall heteroskedasticity test 
(P-value) - - 0.161 
Anderson under-identification test 
(P-value) - - 0.000 
p values in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Nakamura/Nakamura’s test gives “Price of consultation” as endogenous (p=0.000), and the reverse 
correlation also valid (Table 4). Therefore the 3SLS model shows a better fit (in bold). 
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Appendix B. The French Medical Sector 
 
Main characteristics of the French general practice system 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 
Payment scheme  Fee-for-service Fee-for-service 
Prices of medical 
services 
Regulated prices, “prix 
conventionnés”: fixed by an 
agreement between the GPs and the 
health insurance administration 
(“Sécurité Sociale”)  
Free pricing (higher than in 
sector 1); 
Cost for the GPs: greater 
personal social insurance 
contribution 
Coverage and 
dates 
Represents approximately 90% of 
GPs 
Created in 1980; access closed 
in 1990 
Reimbursement 
for the patients 
Generally, 100% of the reference 
price. 70% by Social Security, 30% 
by complementary insurance, 
(“mutuelle”) if the patient has it 
(90%). 
Generally, the extra price has to 
be paid by the patient, though 
certain complementary insurance 
policies cover extra costs. 
 
 
